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NO. 48871-2021
Kootenai County
Case No. CR28-20-5762

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Elizabeth Britiany Keyes failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion when it imposed aggregate sentence totaling 25 years with 10 years determinate upon
her convictions for murder in the second degree and alteration or concealment of evidence?
ARGUMENT
Keyes Has Failed to Show that the District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
No one, including Elizabeth Britiany Keyes, knew she was pregnant until she delivered a

full term baby boy in the bathroom of her boyfriend’s family home. (PSI, pp. 92, 179, 182-83,
187, 334-37, 366; Confidential Exhibits, pp. 66-67, 91.) For reasons which remain unfathomable,
Keyes strangled the newborn to death, made superficial cuts along his lower abdomen, and used a

utility knife to slice his body open from the midline of his chest to his abdomen, exposing loops
of the small bowel and slicing his liver. (PSI, pp. 8, 10-13, 92-96, 109-11; Confidential Exhibits,
pp. 37, 39-42, 44-45, 68, 70-72, 75-77, 88-89, 97-104.) Keyes then attempted to clean the
bathroom, placing the bloody utility knife in a bathroom drawer, placing bloody debris and the
corpse of the dead baby into a garbage bag, and placing the garbage bag on the front porch. (PSI,
pp. 92-96, 107, 335, 367; Confidential Exhibits, pp. 46-60, 72-74, 94, 114-16.) Keyes told her
boyfriend’s mother that she believed she had just had a miscarriage and went to bed. (PSI, pp.
179, 367; Confidential Exhibits, p. 90.)
The following morning, the sister of Keyes’ boyfriend became concerned when she found
blood in the bathroom and ultimately found the baby inside the trash bag. (PSI, pp. 47, 92, 33435.) The sister wrapped the baby and the placenta in a towel and drove Keyes and the baby to the
hospital. (PSI, pp. 2, 47, 96, 335-36) There, hospital staff found the dead baby in the backseat of
the car and a bloody Keyes who “appeared to be in emotional shock” and had a “kind of flat affect
… just expressionless.” (PSI, pp. 132, 368, 384.)
Upon viewing the abdominal wound, hospital staff called the police. (PSI, p. 184.) A
detective interviewed Keyes in the hospital, questioning her about her pregnancy, delivery, and
the cause of death of her baby. (PSI, pp. 368-375; Confidential Exhibits, pp. 61-93.) Throughout
questioning, Keyes claimed she was unaware she was pregnant and could recall neither the
delivery nor strangulation of the baby. (PSI, p. 93, 369-74; Confidential Exhibits, pp. 68-69, 7173, 75-77, 87-89, 91.) Keyes recalled some details of cutting her baby and was able to tell the
detective what type of knife she used, but seemed unable to explain why she cut the baby. (PSI,
pp. 93, 372; Confidential Exhibits, 70-72.)
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Admitted to the Kootenai Health behavioral health unit, Keyes’ psychiatric evaluator noted
she presented as “exhibiting an unexpected and inappropriately bland affect for the circumstances,
and seemed very detached or even experiencing dissociation.” (PSI, p 132.) He noted her affect
“[r]anged from blunted to smiling, with occasional nervous laughter that was incongruent with her
mood and circumstances. She appeared anxious at times … but she did not appear to cry or shed
any tears during the visit.” (PSI, p. 136.)
The state charged Keyes with murder in the first degree and alteration or concealment of
evidence. (R., pp. 165-66, 204-05.) Keyes pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement in which
the state agreed to amend the first degree murder charge to second degree murder and Keyes agreed
to plead guilty under Alford. (R., pp. 549-51, 553-55). The district court imposed a sentence of
25 years, ten fixed for murder in the second degree and five years, zero fixed for alteration or
concealment of evidence, to be served concurrently. (R., pp. 671-72.)
Keyes filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 673-76.)
Keyes challenges the district court’s decision to sentence her to an aggregate 25 years with
ten years fixed. Keyes has failed to show an abuse of discretion.
B.

Standard of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007)
(citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho
201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the
burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577,
38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). In
evaluating whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part
3

inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise of reason.”

State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018)

(citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
C.

Keyes Has Shown No Abuse of the Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met this burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release the defendant on parole
is exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be
the period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive,
the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96, 392
P.3d at 1236-37 (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).
The district court’s factual finding and reasoning for its sentence show no abuse of
discretion. Second-degree murder is punishable by ten years to life. I.C. § 18-4004. At the
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sentencing hearing, the district court considered the Toohill 1 factors and heard arguments from the
state and Keyes regarding relevant factors, but ultimately determined the most important factor in
this case is deterrence to the public, followed by punishment. (Tr., p. 123, Ls, 10-24.) “This
sentence is to punish you,” the district court stated, “but primarily it’s a sentence that is put in
place to try to maintain an organized society.” (Tr., p. 124, Ls. 1-3.) The district court carefully
considered the evidence presented by the state and Keyes. It reviewed the photographs submitted
by the state of the crime scene and the autopsy photos of Baby Boy Keyes. (Tr., p. 122, L. 24 – p.
123, L. 3.) The district court considered the arguments presented by Keyes which showed her
good character and the strong support she received from family and friends. (Tr., p. 128, L. 10 –
p. 129, L. 6.) The district court crafted a sentence with a reduced fixed amount that met the four
criteria in sentencing and honored the goal of being “able to live in an organized and … lawabiding society.” (Tr., p. 129, Ls. 6-10.)
Keyes acknowledges that “her actions required the district court to impose a prison
sentence” yet argues her “mental state,” “support of family and friends, and remorse” should have
lead the district court to a less-severe sentence. (Appellant’s brief, p. 6). Keyes’ claims are
unpersuasive. In regards to her mental state, the district court determined that neither argument
presented by the state nor Keys mattered, ultimately. (Tr., p. 125, Ls. 2-6; p. 129, L. 22 – p.130,
L. 1.) Whether Keyes was in a “dream-like,” dissociative event, as she argued, or trying to cover
up a pregnancy, as the state argued, did not factor into the district court’s sentencing. (PSI, p. 339;
Tr., p. 107, L. 7 – p. 108, L. 9; p. 112, Ls. 9-21; p. 123, Ls. 3-9.) “It doesn’t matter,” the district
court said repeatedly. (Tr., p. 124, Ls. 7-10; p. 125, Ls. 2-6, 15-22; p. 125, L. 23 – p. 126, L. 4; p.
126, Ls. 19-20.) In a case with such rare and unusual circumstances, the district court determined
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State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
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“deterrence of the public is the most important.” (Tr., p. 124, L. 16 – p. 125, L. 1; p. 128, Ls. 89.) The court carefully considered what sentence would give Keyes the “minimum amount” of
prison time but “would still be a deterrent to those in the future.” (Tr., p. 126, Ls., 21-24.)
“I think you are a good person,” the district court informed Keyes. (Tr., p. 128, Ls. 13-14.)
“You are a kind and caring person.” (Tr., p. 128, Ls. 22-23.) The district court considered Keyes’
support from family and friends carefully and accepted as true the good things her family said
about her. (Tr., p. 128, Ls. 21-22.) The court recognized Keyes as, for the most part, a “very lawabiding person.” (Tr., p. 129, Ls. 5-6.) Though her motivations for the murder may never be
known, the district court recognized Keyes did intend to strangle, cut, and dispose of her baby.
(Tr., p. 130, Ls. 3-10.) Considering the four factors in sentencing, the district court could not “give
[Keyes her] freedom today,” but imposed the least amount of prison time appropriate under the
four sentencing criteria factors. (Tr., p, 129, Ls. 11-12; p. 130, Ls. 20-22.)
The district court considered all mitigating and aggravating factors and crafted a
sentence that demonstrated a balance of compassion for Elizabeth Keyes, the serious and tragic
nature of her crime, while imposing a sentence meant to “maintain an organized society.” (Tr.,
p. 124, Ls. 2-3.) The concurrent sentences of 25 years with ten years determinate for seconddegree murder and five years, zero fixed for alteration or concealment of evidence were
reasonable given the gravity of the crimes and in light of the applicable criteria for sentencing
and were within the district court’s discretion. Keyes has failed to show error.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 20th day of December, 2021

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
MOLLY GARNER
Paralegal
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